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Abstract
El capital huma i, per tant, l'educacio tenen un impacte en el benestar futur de la soci-
etat. En aquest treball s'estudia la connexio entre el suport dels votants per una educacio
publica i les preocupacions sobre la seva jubilacio. Mostrem com els votants anticipen
els efectes positius que te l'educacio sobre les pensions futures. Aix, el recolzament a
un sistema educatiu public s'incrementa si el sistema de pensions es mes redistributiu,
cosa que tambe es dona entre els ciutadans que prefereixen una educacio privada. Tambe
mostrem que el tipus d'equilibri \ends against the middle" pot ocorrer ns i tot quan la
taxa impositiva preferida pels votants es decreixent amb la renda.
Human capital and, therefore, education have an impact on the society's future welfare.
In this paper we study the connection between the voters' support to public education and
the retirement concerns. We show that voters anticipate the positive eect of education
on future pensions. The support for a publicly nanced education system increases, the
more redistributive the pension system is, and this is true also amongst citizens preferring
a private school. We also show that the \ends against the middle" equilibrium can occur
even when the voters' preferred tax rate is decreasing in income.
JEL Classication number: D72, H31, H42, H52, H55
Keywords: Education, Pension System, Voting, Altruism, OLG
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1 Introduction
Public debt concerns call for a reduction of the decit and a reform of the welfare system.
This paper contributes to the rich literature on the political economy of publicly provided
goods, combining the voters' concerns for the provision of public education and of pensions.
Indeed, education and the pension system share several features, for instance, both are
publicly nanced/provided private goods1 that are often used for inter- and intra-generational
redistribution purposes. Both are deeply scrutinised, which limits the policy space of a politi-
cian with re-election concerns. Few papers consider simultaneously the provision of these two
goods,2 and they all conclude that, at least in the long run, education has a positive eect
on growth and, consequently, a more generous pension system is sustainable.3 In this paper,
we explicitly model the demand for public education, when this has an impact on future
welfare, and in particular the average income of the future generation depends on the current
investment in education.
The microeconomic justication for agents' desire for a publicly nanced education relates
to a willingness of agents to guarantee a minimum level of education for all the citizens.4 In
part this is explained as intergenerational altruism5 (parents care about their own children's
education); another explanation is that agents care about the level of education of the whole
society 6 In our model we account for both types of altruism and we add a third compon-
ent: assuming a positive relationship between education and future incomes, we obtain a link
between future pensions and the current level of education. Agents internalise the eect of
1Among others, Lochner and Moretti (2004), Checchi (2003), and Cai and Treisman (2004) provide some
justications for the public nancing of private goods such as education.
2Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) focus on the optimal (in terms of growth) allocation of tax proceeds between
education and social security. Similarly, Pecchenino and Pollard (2002) and Zhang and Zhang (2004) study
the impact of social security and education on growth. Soares (2003) uses an OLG model of growth, in which
agents choose the public investment in education and allocate their time between investing in human capital
and working. Section IV in Pirttila and Tuomala (2002) uses the investment on education as a determinant
of productivity and studies the long run impact of public education and the use of education and pensions to
have transfers among the population. Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Boldrin and Montes (2009) use an OLG
model to study education and pensions. While our approach is positive, these are normative studies. The
rst one describes the theoretical design to accomplish the optimal intergenerational transfer scheme through
pensions and education. The second one tests the theoretical model in the presence of demographic shocks,
using Spanish data.
3The idea of education having an impact on growth and productivity has been also broadly used in the
growth literature (Romer 1986, Lucas 1988, Gradstein and Justman 1997).
4From a microeconomic perspective, education is sometimes treated as a consumption good (Dur and
Glazer 2008), or it is consumed for its signaling role on the labour market (Spence 1973) and, more generally,
to increase own future expected income. These model are explain the consumption of education, but do not
explain why it should be publicly nanced.
5See Epple and Romano (1996a), (1996b), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), Chen and West (2000), Cohen-Z-
ada and Justman (2003), Gradstein and Justman (2005), and Piolatto (2010).
6This may happen for pure altruism or because of some positive externalities, such as the reduction in
social conicts, as in Lott 1990, Usher 1997 and Gradstein 2000). With a little abuse of notation, we dene
this behaviour as \altruistic", even if it may be the consequence of some selsh decisions.
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education on pensions. If pensions are redistributive, therefore, agents care about others'
level of education, and the more redistributive is the pension system, the more voters care
about others' education. Therefore, we expect higher support for public spending in educa-
tion where the pension system is more redistributive. Indeed, empirical evidence conrms
a negative correlation between the Bismark Factor (a measure of the degree of redistribu-
tion, decreasing when redistribution increases) and total (Figures 1) and per-capita (Figure
2) public expenditure in education.7
Figure 1: Bismarkian factor vs total public spending on eduction (% of GDP) in OECD
countries
In our model, agents attend either a publicly nanced school or a (costly) private one
and vote over the tax rate to nance public education. Voters' decision depends also on the
eect of education on pensions. Agents know and account for the fact that the average level
of education of society has an impact on the pension system, with the impact's magnitude
depending on the degree of redistribution of the pension scheme. In order to disentangle
this private benet accrued from others' education from any possible altruistic behaviour,
we account separately for both in the agents' utility function. We model an overlapping
generations (OLG) society in which agents, on top of the altruistic component, perceive a
pension in their last period of life that depends on the population's average instruction.8
A notable result of the model is that it reconciles two results in the literature that were
7See appendix A.1 for more details on data sources and denition of variables.
8We explicitly analyse the case of pensions, but minor modications allow to reinterpret the model in terms
of the impact of average education on citizens' welfare via any social security service implying some income
redistribution.
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Figure 2: Bismarkian factor vs public expenditure per student (% GDP per capita) in OECD
countries
previously considered as incompatible. In a dual (public-private) educational system, prefer-
ences are not single peaked and the median voter theorem does not apply (Stiglitz 1974). In
the theoretical literature, the Slope Rising in Income (SRI) and Slope Decreasing in Income
(SDI) assumptions guarantee the existence of a voting equilibrium.9 The intuition behind
the alternatives is that an increase in the tax rate implies both more redistribution and bet-
ter quality of the public service. When (in terms of voters' preferences) the former element
dominates the latter, preferences show the SDI property and viceversa. The standard result
under SDI (Gradstein, Justman, and Meier 2005) is that a coalition of the wealthier voters op-
poses a coalition of the poorest in determining the preferred tax to nance education. Under
SRI (Epple and Romano 1998, and Epple et al. 2004), instead, the ends against the middle
equilibrium (middle class versus the wealthy and poor voters) prevails. There is no strong
evidence suggesting that one assumption is more realistic. We show that the ends against
the middle equilibrium can occur even within the SDI framework. We also conclude that the
common result of the median voter being pivotal under SDI is not robust to the introduction
of education externalities.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 presents the model, section 3 describes
9These two, mutually exclusive, assumptions (widely used in the literature) introduce a monotonicity re-
striction, implying a Single Crossing Property analogous to the Spence-Mirrlees condition. The preferred tax
rate (conditional on attending public school) is assumed to be respectively increasing or decreasing in income.
Technically, it is a condition on the sign of the derivative (with respect to income) of the marginal rate of
substitution between education and the numeraire: non-negative under SRI and non-positive under SDI.
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the agents' behaviour, and section 4 shows the possible equilibria. Section 5 illustrates the
model using a specic functional form and provides some comparative statics results, while
section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Three cohorts (students, adults and retirees) live at the same time. There is no population
growth: each adult has one child. At the end of each period, children become adults and adults
retire. Compulsory education is both publicly and privately provided: the two are mutually
exclusive. The quality of education, modelled as per-student expenditure, is denoted by XP
for the public sector and XR for the private one. X is the average quality of education,
measured in terms of the cohort's average spending for instruction.
Public education is nanced through a proportional tax (t) on income (!) and its access is
free. We assume the quality of public education to be homogeneous amongst schools. Private
schools are costly, and students choose the level of quality to buy.10
Adults vote over the universal tax rate to nance public education, and choose the in-
struction that their child receives (public or private). For private school students, the decision
includes the share of budget devoted to education; the remaining is used to consume the nu-
meraire b. When deciding, they are concerned by their children's education and their own
consumption of the numeraire (both in the current and in the next period of their life) as
in the models of \intergenerational altruism". Adults care also about others' education: we
separate here the two components presented in the introduction. On the one hand, we con-
sider the \direct eect", or \altruism" (agents care about the average level of education, for
any possible reason, including social stability), and the \indirect eect", or \selsh compon-
ent" that accounts for the eect (through pensions) of others' education on the own future
consumption.
Altruism enters the utility function through V : <2 ! < depending on both X and
individuals' income !.11
The average income of each generation is assumed to be a positive function of the education
received: increasing the tax rate increases the average educational level and also agents' future
income. This aects retirees' pension, via the public pension system.
10One can think of a person choosing amongst dierent schools, or a single school proposing extra services
a la carte (e.g., elective classes, gym, library, extra-curricular activities).
11There are several rationales for altruism (as we broadly dened it) to depend on income and in particular to
be increasing in it. As discussed in Dur and Teulings (2001): richer people's marginal utility of consumption is
lower; education is often positively correlated both with income and with the importance that people attribute
to others' education; richer people care more about social stability (and education has an impact on it); nally
education can be a cheaper and preferable way to redistribute amongst social classes.
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In period z, the life-time utility function, Wz, assumed to be separable, is
Wz(X; bz; bz+1; X; !z) = U(X; bz) +G(bz+1) + V (X;!z) (1)
where U is the utility during adulthood (depending on consumption and owns children's school
quality), G is the utility of consumption when retired, and V is the altruistic component.
Adults face three trade-os: 1) consumption of the numeraire versus their child's education,
2) current versus future consumption, and 3) own consumption versus average education of
society (that comes from the altruistic component of the utility function).
For the sake of simplicity, people do not discount the future. Income, endogenous and
time dependent, is distributed on the interval (!min; !max)z, with density fz and cumulative
distribution Fz. The average income is !z =
R !max
!min
!zf(!z)d!z. Besides the tax to nance
public education, a tax of rate s is levied to nance pensions: adults' disposable income is
!, where  = [1  t  s]). Retirees' only source of income is given by their pension, which
is not taxed.
The pension system is of the Pay-As-You-Go type consisting, similarly to Casamatta et al.
(2000b), of a contributory and a noncontributory part. The pension system is mixed: a retiree
in period z + 1 receives s  !z + [1   ]s  !z+1. That is: he receives a fraction  2 [0; 1] of
the tax for pension (s  !z) paid in period z (contributory or Bismarkian component), and a
share [1   ] of the average contribution s  !z+1 paid by current workers (noncontributory
component); both s and  are exogenous.12
We assume the usual regularity conditions. Goods are normal (income elasticity takes
values in the interval (0; 1)), functions U , G and V are of class C2 or higher, U is increasing
and concave both inX and b, and there are no cross eects betweenX and !

i.e., @
2U
@!@X = 0

.
G is increasing and concave in consumption and V is increasing and concave in average
education quality.
In order to capture the presence of some positive externalities of agents' education on
income, we assume that adults' average income ! is an increasing and concave function of
the average level of education: @!
@X
 0 and @2!
@X
2  0.
Lemma 1 (Aggregate expenditure for education). The aggregate educational expenditure is
increasing in the tax rate t: @@t

t!z +
R !max
!min
XR(!z)d!z

 0.
Proof. A rise in the tax rate implies a reduction in disposable income for all agents. Those
attending private school adjust their consumption of education according to their income
elasticity of demand. Under the assumption of normality of X, the reduction in consumption
is lower than the extra tax collected. Since all the collected tax is used to nance public
education, aggregate expenditure in education is positively correlated with the tax rate t.
12See Casamatta et al. (2000b) for a model on retirements with vote over s.
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Corollary. Because education is measured in terms of expenditure, lemma 1 implies that
average education is increasing in the tax rate.
Corollary. Given the relation between average income and average education, and the previ-
ous corollary, we conclude that !z is a function of tz 1, with @!z=@tz 1 > 0 and @2!z=@t2z 1 
0. Henceforth, we replace the notation !z by !(tz 1), to stress the intertemporal relation oc-
curring with a one period lag.
Corollary. Altruism is increasing in the tax rate: dV (tz ;!)dtz  0: by the chain rule, V increases
in average educational expenditure and thus in the tax level.
Remark: Income, depending on t, is endogenous. We do not compute the steady state
level of t. Therefore, we do not need to specify the density function fz nor do we need to
study how income changes through time. Even though the density function might change over
time, and so its extremes (!min; !max), the model's results are not aected, since they focus
on the way coalitions are formed and not on the tax rate's absolute value. The ceteris paribus
consequences on the tax rate of a generalised increase in income are a priori unknown. The
assumptions on the preferred tax (SRI and SDI) only concern an agent's preferred tax, when
others' contributions are constant. When others' income levels change, for a constant tax
rate, tax proceeds and per student expenditure rise. The preferred tax rate remains constant
only if utility functions are homothetic, otherwise it might increase or decrease through time.
We restrict our attention to when the monotonicity condition Slope Decreasing in Income
(SDI) holds for function U : the marginal rate of substitution between education and the
numeraire is decreasing in income

@MRSX;b
@!  0

.13
Population is normalised to one and the share of students attending a public school is np.
From the government budget constraint, the quality of public school XP is equal to
XP =
t!
np
(2)
Adults' consumption of the numeraire is equal to bz = !  XR (disposable income net
of the expenditure for private education). To stress that numeraire's consumption is dierent
for agents attending a private school, for the numeraire consumption level in period z we use
the notation bz = ! when XR = 0 (agents attending public school) and bz;R = !   XR
when XR 6= 0.
13The only role of the SDI assumption in this paper is to allow easy comparisons with similar papers. The
main model results are not aected.
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Equation (1), dening the lifetime utility of an agent, can be rewritten as follows
Wz =
U(XP ; bz)+ G(bz+1)+ V (tz; !) for XR = 0 (3a)
U(XR; bz;R)+ G(bz+1)+ V (tz; !) for XR 6= 0; (3b)
where Equation (3a) represents the utility of an agent whose child attends a public school,
while Equation (3b) is for the others.
All relevant decisions are taken by adults. They choose their osprings' school (public or
private), they vote over the tax rate t and (for the case of private education) they choose how
to share their budget between children's school tuition and the numeraire. Retirees consume
all their pension to buy the numeraire good, which implies that a retiree's consumption of
numeraire in period z + 1 is given by bz+1 = s  !z + [1  ]s  !(tz).
Lemma 2. The third derivatives of functions U and G with respect to their arguments are
positive, that is: @
3U
@X3
 0, @3U
@b3
 0, @3G
@b3
 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
3 Voters' behaviour
We analyse here voters' behaviour, separating those preferring public education subsection
3.1) from the others (subsection 3.2). To do that, we rst introduce two known results that we
use subsequently: i) an income threshold !^(t) exists, such that agents prefer public school if
and only if ! < !^(t), while for ! = !^(t) they are indierent; ii) the threshold !^(t) determines
a unique equilibrium. Note that adults' choice between public and private education only
depends on the rst part of the utility function (U), which shows the same properties as the
utility function in Epple and Romano (1996a) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1998).
The maximisation problem of an agent whose child attends a private school is:
max
XR
Wz = U(XR; bz;R) +G(bz+1) + V (tz; !) (4)
s:t: bz;R = (1  t  s)!  XR
bz+1 = s  !z + [1  ]s  !z+1
The level of XR maximising Equation (4) depends on t and it solves the equation:
@U
@XR
=
@U
@b . We dene X

R = argmax(Wz). The value for t also denes the numeraire consumption
of adults choosing public education, this being all their disposable income.
Lemma 3 (From Epple and Romano, 1996a). Agents prefer private schooling, if and only if
U(XR; bz;R) > U(XP ; bz). Given t, the level of income !^(t) that makes an agent indierent
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between the alternatives is unique. For any income ! > !^(t), U(XR; bz;R) > U(XP ; bz); vice
versa, if ! < !^(t), then U(XR; bz;R) < U(XP ; bz).
Proof. Since Equation (4) depends on XR only through its rst component, the framework
is the same as in Epple and Romano (1996a). See Epple and Romano (1996a), pp. 300-304
and in particular lemma 1 (and its corollary 1) and lemma 2 for the proof.
The share of students in public school, np, depends on the distribution of income:
14
np = F (!^(t)).
Lemma 4 (From Glomm and Ravikumar, 1998). For all t 2 (0; 1), it exists a unique np that
solves np = F (!^(t)). It can be observed that !^(t) is decreasing in np, while increasing in !
and in t.
Proof. See proposition 2 and lemma 1 in Glomm and Ravikumar (1998).
The income level for which an agent is indierent between public and private education
decreases in the number of public school students

@!^
@np
< 0

, this comes from a congestion
eect: the per-student available resources decrease when more students choose public edu-
cation (given the tax rate), this makes public education less attractive and, therefore, the
income cut-o level to be indierent between the public and private education decreases. A
change in the tax rate inuences !^(t) through two channels: it increases the total resources
for public education, and it reduces agents' disposable income: numeraire's consumption falls
and its marginal utility increases. Out of equilibrium, a further (indirect) eect of a tax
increase is that it provokes an increase in np, which causes a reduction of !^(t).
3.1 The behaviour of voters preferring public education (! < !^)
The utility function of agents whose child attends public school (i.e., ! < !^) is given by
Equation (3a), which can be rewritten as:
Wz = U

t!
np
; !

+G(s  !z + [1  ]s  !(tz)) + V (tz; !) (5)
The maximisation of this expression with respect to tz yields the following rst order
condition:
!z
@U
@b
=
!z
np
@U
@X
+ k
@!(tz)
@tz
@G
@b
+
@V
@tz
(6)
where factor k = s[1 ] relates retirees' pension in time z+1 to adults' average income in z+1,
which depends on the current tax rate tz. It is an equity measure, i.e., it computes how much
the society is redistributing, and it is equal to 0 under a purely Bismarckian/contributory
14See Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) for more details and properties of np:
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system ( = 1). A decrease in k implies a reduction in adults' marginal benets of increasing
the current education tax. Equation (6) implicitly denes t(!), the preferred tax rate of an
agent of income !, equating the marginal cost and the marginal benet of increasing the tax.
The left hand side represents the loss of utility caused by a reduction in the consumption of
the numeraire during the current period. The right hand side includes the additional utility
generated by i) the higher quality of education that the own child receives (rst term), ii)
the increase in future consumption, through the increase in pensions (second term), iii) the
altruistic attitude component, for which the average education level matters (last term).
Note that 1) if pensions are not related to the educational level (i.e., the pension system
is purely contributory or education does not aect wages) and 2) agents are not altruistic
( @V@tz = 0), then we are back to the model of Epple and Romano (1996a).
Equation (6) can be rewritten as:
!z
@U
@b
  !z
np
@U
@X
= k
@!(tz)
@tz
@G
@b
+
@V
@tz
(7)
The right hand side accounts for the second period consumption and the altruistic component.
It is a function of the Bismarckian factor, the impact of t on average income, the importance
of the second period consumption and altruism, and it is always positive. The left hand side
regroups the eects of a tax rate change on the rst-period utility. It takes negative values in
the unrealistic case of
@U=@X
@U=@b >
np!z
! , which is a condition on the marginal rate of substitution
between education and current consumption, occurring if the marginal utility of education is
so large that agents prefer not to consume the numeraire in the rst period of life.
Lemma 5. For a voter whose child is attending a public school, the preferred tax changes
with income as follows:
@t
@!
=
 @U@b   !z @
2U
@b2
+ ks@!(tz)@tz
@2G
@b2
+ @
2V
@t@!
 

!2z
@2U
@b2
+
h
!z
np
i2
@2U
@X2
+ k @
2!(tz)
@t2z
@G
@b +
h
k @!(tz)@tz
i2
@2G
@b2
+ @
2V
@t2
 : (8)
The sign of Equation (8) is given by
sign

@t
@!

= sign

 @U
@b
  !z @
2U
@b2
+ ks
@!(tz)
@tz
@2G
@b2
+
@2V
@t@!

; (9)
and it depends on the last term (the derivative of the altruism component V ), absent which
Equation (8) is always negative.
Proof. Equation 8 is obtained by implicitly deriving Equation 6 with respect to !. Its sign
only depends on the numerator: the denominator is always negative and becomes positive,
being preceded by the minus sign. Furthermore, ks@!(tz)@tz
@2G
@b2
is always negative and so does
11
also  @U@b   !z @
2U
@b2
by the SDI assumption. Consequently, only @
2V
@t@! may reverse the sign of
the equation, if positive and suciently large.
In Epple and Romano (1996a), the SDI assumption (implying  @U@b  ! @
2U
@b2
 0) ensures
that the preferred tax is decreasing in income. Here two additional terms contribute to
determine if the preferred tax is increasing in income, which occurs if and only if @
2V
@t@! 
@U
@b + !z
@2U
@b2

  ks@!(tz)@tz @
2G
@b2
: On the right hand side, both the bracketed term and the
remaining term are positive: the intuition is that the rst period dis-utility from an increase
in t is increasing in income (elements in the bracket) and the second period utility variation
for a tax increases is decreasing in income (element outside the bracket).
Dene ~! as the inexion point for which Equation (8) equals 0, that is @t
(!)
@! j~!= 0.
Then, further deriving Equation (8) with respect to ! determines if the preferred tax rate
is concave or convex in income, thus if ~! is a minimum or a maximum. The shape of the
preferred tax depends on: i) the impact on agents utility of the numeraire consumption
(both in their rst and second period of life) and ii) the shape of function V (how income
aects altruism). Unfortunately, we cannot determine the concavity of t(!) (nor the sign of
Equation 8) without adding some additional assumptions on the shape of the third derivatives
of U , G, and V .
As a way to reduce the possible cases to study, we present empirical evidence aimed at
nding a justication for focusing on the convex case. Indeed, our evidence (described in
Appendix A.2) suggests that the preferred tax rate is convex in income; almost everywhere
decreasing, although we cannot exclude that it may increase for suciently large levels of
income. Limitations in the available data and in the possible proxies for the preferred tax
rate made it impossible to have unquestionable results. Nevertheless, based on what empir-
ical evidence there is, we proceed under the assumption that the preferred tax is convex in
income.15
3.2 The behaviour of voters preferring private education ( ! > !^)
In Epple and Romano (1996a), parents of private school students are always in favour of no
tax. The additional factors introduced (pension concerns and altruism) aect their behaviour.
The utility function of agents whose children (at equilibrium) attend private school (i.e.,
! > !^) is given by Equation (3b), which can be rewritten as:
Wz = U(X

R; !  XR) +G(s  !z + [1  ]s  !(tz)) + V (tz; !z) (10)
15Note that the results for the concave case were qualitatively similar to those of the convex case. Readers
interested in the analysis of the concave case can refer to a previous and preliminary version of this study,
published as working paper Piolatto (2011).
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From the F.O.C. we derive the preferred tax rate, dened implicitly as:
!z
@U
@b
= k
@!(tz)
@tz
@G
@b
+
@V
@tz
: (11)
In Equation (11), the marginal cost of decreasing consumption in the rst period equals the
sum of consumption benets in the second period and the additional utility connected with
benevolence. A change in t does not aect XR. Given income, the preferred tax is smaller
for voters choosing a private school: indeed here, compared to Equation (6), the !np
@U
@X term
is missing, which means that people do not care about the quality of public school per se.
Moreover, numeraire consumption is lower (because of the school tuition to be paid), thus
the marginal cost of an additional reduction in consumption is larger. In fact, ! XR < !
(where ! is the consumption of numeraire of people attending public school), thus the
marginal cost of the tax (! @U@b ) for adults choosing a private school for their osprings is
larger than if they had chosen a public school.
Lemma 6. For voters whose child attends private school, the preferred tax changes with
income as follows:
@t
@!
=    
@U
@b   !z @
2U
@b2
+ ks@!(tz)@tz
@2G
@b2
+ @
2V
@t@!
!2z
@2U
@b2
+ k @
2!(tz)
@t2z
@G
@b +
h
k @!(tz)@tz
i2
@2G
@b2
+ @
2V
@2t
: (12)
Altruism absent, the preferred tax is always decreasing in income.
Proof. Use the implicit function theorem on Equation 11 to compute the derivative of the
optimal tax with respect to income. The denominator is always negative. The sign, as in the
previous section, depends only on the numerator. The SDI assumption is sucient to ensure
that the sign of the two rst terms in the numerator is always negative.
Qualitatively, the shape of t is the same for agents preferring private (! > !^) and public
education (! < !^).
4 Equilibrium
When comparing the behaviour of voters preferring either type of education, we obtain the
following result, stated in Lemma 7, concerning the preferred tax rate:
Lemma 7. The sign of Equations (8) and (12) is the same. This means that, although the
preferred tax rate depends on voters school choice, the way it changes with income (sign of
the derivative) is the same. More importantly, the stationary point ~! is the same regardless
of the chosen type of education. As we concentrate on the convex case, the stationary point ~!
represents the income of the agent for which the preferred tax rate is the lowest amongst all
the agents that have chosen the same type of education.
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Proof. Because the numerator of both Equations (8) and (12) is the same; dierences in the
denominator determine a change in the value of t but not in the sign. The stationary point
~! coincides with the point in which the numerator equals zero, thus it is the same for both
types of agent.
The previous lemma states that the stationary point ~! (which under the convexity as-
sumption is a minimum) does not depend on the school choice. Instead, the value of the
preferred tax does depend on the school choice, as stressed by the following Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The preferred tax rate is always larger for agents if their children attend
public school.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Figure 3 represents a possible shape of the preferred tax rate, for the convex case, distin-
guishing between the case of public and private education.
Figure 3: The preferred tax rate (convex case) depends on the chosen type of education
Under the same assumptions, in Epple and Romano (1996a) the median voter is always
decisive. In terms of coalition formation, their equilibrium seems not to be robust to the
introduction of altruism and pension concerns. We derive here some general properties on
the type of equilibrium and in particular on the type of coalitions that may form, without
using specic functional forms.16 We conclude that coalitions, contrary to what predicted in
Epple and Romano (1996a), are not always homogeneous in income.
For agents with income ! > !^ (private school costumers), the direct eect of a tax is
always negative (it is only a cost). Indirect eects are positive through the change on the
average level of education and income. An increase in t induces a rise in consumption when
retired; the redistributive eect of pensions has a larger impact on agents with a lower income,
who will thus be more prone to an increase in the tax rate. If the pension system is highly
16We cannot solve the model in closed form without introducing some further assumptions and using specic
functional forms.
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redistributive (that is, when  is small), then all agents consumption in the last period of life
(i.e., retirement) will heavily depend on average income and thus on average education. As
a consequence, the support for a larger tax rate increase also amongst agents with income
above the average (it is the only way to increase the level of consumption in retirement).
Altruism induces all voters to be in favour of positive tax rates. The willingness to smooth
consumption over time (intertemporal elasticity of substitution) and to balance the marginal
utility of the numeraire and of education (intra-goods elasticity of substitution), and the
degree of benevolence of the society, all contribute to determine the degree of convexity of
the utility function.
We turn now to the political game in which the tax rate to nance public education, t,
is chosen. An equilibrium consists of a tax rate t such that half of the population would
prefer a higher tax rate, while the other half would prefer a lower one. We solve the model
graphically, and we identify the types of coalition that can form, when people are asked to
choose the equilibrium tax. For our graphical analysis of the equilibrium we use Figure 4
to distinguish all possible coalitions that may form. Since we observe a discontinuity in the
preferred tax rate for the income level ! = !^ (the income of the agent indierent between
public and private school), the equilibrium might depend on the position of !^ relative to ~!.
We assemble all agents with the highest preferred tax rate, up to form a group of half
of the population. The light-grey areas in Figure 4 correspond to levels of income for which
households prefer a reduction in the tax rate. The dashed lines identify the equilibrium tax
rate, that by construction is such that half of the population (dark-grey area) would prefer
a larger tax rate, and the corresponding Condorcet winner(s) that, a priori, is dierent from
the preferred tax rate by the voter who is indierent between public and private education
(!^), the median voter, and ~!. The preferred tax rate is decreasing for the poorest agents in
society, who always belong to the coalition asking for an increase in the tax rate. Instead, t
may be increasing or decreasing for the richest agent.17
Note that the low-income agents always belong to the coalition in favour of an increase
of the tax rate. This coalition (regrouping half of the population) may be entirely formed
by the poorest agents in the society (equilibrium low income against high income), in which
case the median voter is decisive; it is also possible that the richest agents in the society
also join the coalition, therefore we observe a ends against the middle coalition. It is also
possible that amongst the agents who prefer public education those with the largest income
join the coalition in favour of an increase in the tax rate. Overall we observe, therefore, four
possible coalitions (in terms of income), illustrated in Figure 4 (respectively in the top-left,
17Figure 4 depicts the case of an increasing right tail of the curve, while it is also possible that the function
t(!) is convex and decreasing over all the interval of existence.
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bottom-left, top-right and bottom-right charts): 1) low income against high income, 2) low
income against high income with some middle income agents joining the low income ones,
3) ends against the middle and 4) ends against the middle with some middle income agents
joining the \very low and very high income" coalition. Note that equilibria 2) and 4) are only
possible when !^ > ~!. Further analytical results on the thresholds and conditions determining
the dierent equilibria require introducing additional restrictions on the utility function that
we consider and on the density of the population for dierent levels of income.
Figure 4: The dierent equilibria
Proposition 2. Despite the SDI assumption, both the low income against high income equi-
librium, and the ends against the middle one (opposing the middle class to the rest of the
population) can be observed. For each of the described equilibria a variant may occur, in which
the richest voters amongst those choosing public schools decide to join the coalition asking for
an increase of the tax rate.
Proof. Figure 4 and its explanation serve as a proof. The idea is that the preferred tax rate
function is dened as two discontinuous segments, each convex. According to the population
density function and the value of the function near the discontinuity point, the coalition may
include the poorest agents in the population as well as the richest agents attending public
school and the richest agents attending private school.
When comparing our results with those in Epple and Romano (1996a), the additional
concern for pensions, as well as altruism, will induce larger equilibrium tax rate. What is
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interesting to notice is that a further increase in the tax rate may occur in equilibrium, that
depends on the way the coalition is formed and not directly on the additional concerns that
we introduced in our model, as stated in Proposition (3).
Proposition 3. Any deviation from the low income against high income equilibrium (equi-
valent to the Epple and Romano 1996a result under SDI), results in a higher equilibrium tax
rate.
Proof. Under the SDI assumption, the agents with the lower income have a decreasing pre-
ferred tax rate, with the median voter that is decisive and whose preferred tax rate is the
lowest amongst the agents in the coalition. The two possible deviations from this equilibrium
occur when some agents with income larger than the median voter (either the richest agents
in the society or the richest agents amongst those choosing public education or both) prefer
a tax rate larger than the one preferred by the median voter. In this case, those agents in
the coalition with the lowest preferred tax rate leave the coalition and are replaced by others
with a larger preferred tax rate. The tax rate corresponding to the new decisive voter must
therefore be larger than before.
Corollary. The increase in the equilibrium tax rate necessarily induces, ceteris paribus, an
increase in the per-capita expenditure for public education. This implies that the quality of
public education increases. Part of this increase is oset ( arbitrage eect) by the increase
in the number of students choosing public education as a consequence of it becoming more
attractive.
Agents' motivation to lobby for an increase in the tax rate may be very dierent. Low
income voters desire a good public service and prot of the (intra-temporal) redistribution
between social classes. Both the highest-income voters within the public school and the
highest income agents in the whole population are moved either by pure altruism or because
of the inter-temporal redistribution eect of education, which implies that a larger current tax
rate implies more consumption in the future. Those agents tend to loose from intra-temporal
redistribution, moreover those choosing private education also suer from a low consumption
of the numeraire in the rst period of life, which would further increase in case of a tax
increase.
5 An illustration of the model
In this section we use simple functional forms to illustrate some properties of the model. We
introduce two sets of assumptions. The rst and less restrictive, allows us to obtain some
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general results. The second includes stronger assumptions and we need it to obtain closed-
form solutions for more profound analysis of the problem. We are aware that some of the
assumptions depart from those used in the education literature that calibrate models to t
the data. The complexity of the model requires simple functional forms to make the model
tractable. We believe that this example helps clarify the results of the model.
The rst set of assumptions requires the utility function of households (Equation 1) to
take the form:
W0(X; b0; b1;X; !0) = U(X) + U(b0) +G(b1) + V ((!)X): (13)
Moreover, we assume function U to be homogeneous of degree d, and the income in period 0
to be distributed on the interval [0; 1]. The second group of assumption, that we will use only
later in this section, includes that F0(!) = !
0:2, U() = 10:1()0:1, (!) = g2!2, G(b1) = b1
and !1 = !0 + qX, where the last assumption means that in period 1 the average income
is an ane function of the education received by period 1 workers, with the average income
in the previous period as the constant term; g and q in the previous formulas are numerical
parameters.
Using the rst set of assumptions we can derive the optimal consumption of education
and numeraire for the agents choosing the private education system, which are identical:
XR =
(1 t s)!
2 = b0;R. Given that people choosing public education consume XP =
t!
np
and
b0 = (1  t  s)!, we can compute the income of the indierent agent !^, which is the income
that solves the equation F (!)! = t!(1 t s)
1
U 1(21 d 1) . The average consumption of education
is therefore X = t! +
R 1
!^
1 t s
2 !f(!)d!, which can be rewritten as
X =
1  s
2
Z 1
!^
!f(!)d! +
Z !^
0
!f(!)d! +
1
2
Z 1
!^
!f(!)d!

t: (14)
Finally, from the maximisation problem of agents, we can obtain the rst order condition
that implicitly denes the preferred tax by an agent attending either kind of education.
Equation (6) becomes then
!
np
U 0

t!
np

  !U 0 ((1  t  s)!) + s(1  )@!1
@X
@X
@t
G0(b1) + (!)
@X
@t
V 0
 
(!)X

= 0 (15)
and Equation (11) becomes
!21 dU 0 ((1  t  s)!) = s(1  )@!1
@X
@X
@t
G0(b1) + (!)
@X
@t
V 0
 
(!)X

: (16)
Using the second group of assumptions, the two previous equations become:

def
=

!
np
0:1
t 0:9   !0:1(1  t  s) 0:9 + (sq(1  ) + g2!2) = 0 (17)
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and
t = 1  s  2!
1
9
(sq(1  ) + g2!2) (18)
where 
def
= @X@t  0:0497 is the eect on average education of a marginal change in the tax
rate, under the second set of assumptions, obtained from Equation (14) that now becomes
X = 112(1  s) + 16

1  1
6(20:9 1)10

t.
We can now study the role of the parameter  and how it aects the preferred tax
rate of an agent. For agents choosing public education, we can derive the impact of  as
@t
@ =  
@
@
@
@t
implicitly. Note that the sign only depends on @@ , as the denominator is always
negative by the second order condition from the maximisation problem. The result of the
derivation is @t@ =    qs 0:9 !
np

t 1:9 (1 t s) 1:9
 and, as we expected, the sign of the derivative
is negative. For the agents choosing private education the sign of the derivative is also
negative: @t@ =   2qs!
1=9
(sq(1 )+g2!2)2 .
Giving some numerical values to the parameters s; ; q, and g, the charts in Figure 5 help
understanding the way the coalition forms when voting over the tax rate.
Figure 5: The coalition formation
In Figure 5 the thick line represents the preferred tax by households choosing public
education, and the thin one is for those choosing private education. The vertical dashed-
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dotted line represents the median income agent, and the horizontal dashed line is his preferred
tax rate for  = 0:1 (Bismarkian factor), which is also the value of the parameter for the two
charts on the left side of Figure 5, whereas for the right column we set  = 1. The dotted line
represents the distribution F (!) of the population (using a 1:100 scale to t into the picture).
Comparing the top two charts, we notice that passing from  = 0:1 to  = 1 the preferred
tax rate decreases for all agents, that is, the less redistributive is the social security system,
the lower the preferred tax. Notice that we locate the horizontal dashed line at  = 0:1, so
that it is easier to compare the left charts with the right ones. The two bottom charts diers
from the two previous ones by the level of q, that passes from q = 20 (top charts) to q = 125
(bottom charts). As you can notice, both  and q have an impact on the type of coalition
that forms in equilibrium. While  measures the distributive role of the pension system (a
larger  indicates a larger impact of the contributory part, and thus greater redistribution),
q determines the impact of average education on average income. As is made clear in gure
5, the median income voter is not always decisive. Here, in particular, the agents with the
largest income join the coalition of the ones with the lowest income, and the equilibrium is
of the type \ends against the middle" for both values of . Instead, the bottom-left chart
shows a case in which the preferred tax rate of all the richest agents in the economy is below
the one of the median voter, but when we move to the case of  = 1 (bottom-right gure) we
obtain again that some agents choosing private education prefer a larger tax rate than the
median voter.
6 Conclusions
Adults transfer part of their income to new generations to provide education. Under the Slope
Decreasing in Income (SDI) assumption, the marginal eect on agents' utility of an increase in
the tax rate is larger through the channel of redistribution than through the channel of goods
consumption. Therefore, the poorest voters (that benet from redistribution) are in favour of
large tax rates even at the price of low levels of consumption of the numeraire. On the opposite,
richer voters (amongst those attending public school) prefer a smaller level of consumption
of education since it implies also less redistribution and larger levels of consumption of the
numeraire. Under this setting, the model reproduces the standard results in Epple and
Romano (1996a). The median-income voter is pivotal, his most preferred tax rate is the
majority voting equilibrium, and two coalitions opposes in equilibrium: one composed by the
poorest agents in the economy and the other by the richest ones.
We add to this basic framework two additional reasons, namely pure altruism and self
interest, why a voter may be in favour of publicly nanced education, regardless of having
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children attending a public school. The self interest takes the form of intergenerational re-
distribution of wealth through pensions. Pensions in period t + 1 depend on the level of
education, and thus taxes, in period t. Actually there may be several additional reasons why
even people without children attending public school are interested in a more educated soci-
ety: for instance, this implies less social problems, more technological and scientic progress
(eventually leading to more infrastructures, services for the elders, new medical treatments,
etc.).
Although the introduction of altruism and self interest reduce tractability, it is possible
to solve the model graphically, reducing possible equilibria to four. In addition, section
5 provides a more profound analytical solution of the model, using some specic functional
forms. We conclude that, under this new framework, the median voter is no longer always the
Condorcet winner, this occurs only in one out of four possible cases. Otherwise, a middle-class
coalition opposes, at equilibrium, a coalition of the poorest and richest voters (\ends against
the middle" equilibrium). In both cases, we observe a possible deviation from equilibrium,
with the wealthier agents in public school that may join the coalition calling for an increase in
the tax rate. Those voters are middle-class agents, with an income close to the one of the agent
indierent between public and private education. They are very sensitive to a change in the
tax rate, so that, according to the level of redistribution and their level of altruism, they may
modify their behaviour being in favour of either an increase or a decrease of the equilibrium
tax rate. The result of the basic model is aected by the introduction of the two additional
elements that we proposed, in terms of i) the number of people attending public school: np
weakly increases; ii) the equilibrium value of the tax rate (t), which (weakly) increases too;
iii) the type of equilibrium: we show that some middle and high income agents may join the
coalition in favour of an increase in the tax rate; and iv) the identity of the pivotal voter,
which is no longer the median voter. We leave for future research, the interesting question
of how the political decision over the tax rate to nance public school aects the voters
preferences over the pension system. In particular, it could be interesting to allow agents (as
in Casamatta et al. 2000a) to vote also over the tax s that nances pensions and over the
Bismarkian factor .
21
Appendix
A Empirical appendix
A.1 Empirical evidence: relation between public spending in education
and the pension system
Figures 1 and 2 are constructed using two sources of information. We use the World De-
velopment Indicators (WDI) from the World Bank on public expenditure on education for
a sample of OECD countries. World Bank data for the WDI contains annual data for the
period 1998-2007.
To account for the redistributive component of the pension system (the Bismarkian factor)
we use the estimates of Krieger and Traub (2009) who present the estimation using microdata
(at a household level) taken from the Luxembourg Income Study (Luxembourg Income Study
2008) of the Bismarkian factor. The Bismarkian factor divides the pension benet into a at
component (such as a basic or minimum pension) and into an earnings-related component.
Their results are reproduced in Table 1.
Note from Table 1 that the estimates of the Bismarkian factor are 5 years averages and
only for the period 1998-2002 we have an estimate for all the countries. This has been the
period selected to construct Figures 1 and 2 presented in the text.
In a nal eort to obtain an estimated coecient relating the degree of redistribution
of the pension system and the public expenditure on education we have constructed an un-
balanced dataset to estimate a simple model18 that relates public education spending (real
expenditure on public primary and secondary education) with a series of possible determ-
inants such as income (log of real per capita GDP), demographics (fraction of population
at school age, fraction of population over 65 and fraction of population less than 15), other
economic variables (log of the share of trade, imports and exports over GDP), revenue side
of governments (tax revenues as a % of GDP) and the pension system (Bismarkian factor).
As previously explained, the fact of having the Bismarkian factor for 5-years average re-
duces the number of time observations available to use (although it has the advantage of
avoiding business cycles). Given these data limitations the OLS estimates for the 5-year
period (1988-2002) are not very robust and the estimates of the Bismarkian factor are only
statistically signicant, and negative as expected, when regressed alone against the public ex-
penditure variables. The signicance vanished when we introduce other possible determinants
of public education expenditure, although the negative sign always remains.19
18For a similar econometric framework see for instance Baqir (2002), Verbina and Chowdhury (2004) for
Russia or Fernandez and Rogerson (2001) for US states.
19Econometric results are not reported but available upon request.
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Table 1: Bismarkian factor for selected OECD countries
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Country (1979- (1983- (1988- (1993- (1998- (2003-
1978 1983) 1987) 1992) 1997) 2002) 2004)
Australia { -0.019 -0.093 0.007 0.146 0.025 0.024
Austria { { { { 0.492 0.535 {
Belgium { { 0.413 0.586 0.598 0.516 {
Canada 0.004 0.036 0.048 0.066 0.116 0.129 {
Denmark { { 0.181 0.173 -0.021 0.009 -0.061
Finland { { -0.065 -0.112 -0.029 0.553 0.511
France { 0.697 0.722 0.686 0.778 0.765 {
Germany 0.299 0.409 0.398 0.278 0.491 0.556 {
Greece { { { { 0.694 0.639 {
Ireland { { 0.140 { 0.426 0.436 {
Italy { { 0.378 0.362 0.492 0.551 {
Luxemburg { { 0.382 0.353 0.296 0.328 0.508
Mexico { { 0.539 0.511 0.522 0.689 0.709
Netherlands { 0.156 0.159 0.161 0.236 0.132 {
Norway { 0.301 0.194 0.226 0.151 -0.035 {
Spain { { { 0.427 0.409 0.444 {
Sweden 0.477 0.412 0.476 0.553 0.423 0.432 0.214
Switzerland { 0.257 { 0.185 { 0.551 {
UK -0.019 0.038 0.027 0.047 0.067 0.097 0.132
USA 0.223 0.342 0.296 0.310 0.360 0.458 0.447
A.2 In support of the assumption that the preferred tax rate is convex
In our theoretical model, for the sake of simplicity, we present only the results for the case in
which the preferred tax rate is convex (see Figure 6 and below for its interpretation).20 To the
best of our knowledge, there is no direct way to estimate that shape given that, for instance,
there are no surveys providing such information on taxes. Nevertheless, to approximate the
shape of the individuals preferred tax rate and, hence, to solve the model relying on the
convex case we provide an explanation and empirical evidence that, at least for the US case,
the tax rate seems indeed to be convex.
For this purpose we used data from the PSID (the Panel Study of Income Dynamics), the
longest running longitudinal household survey in the world (directed by faculty at the Univer-
sity of Michigan). The PSID is a US survey covering a representative sample of over 18,000
individuals living in 5,000 families in the United States. The data set contains information
on employment, income, wealth, expenditures, health, marriage, childbearing, child develop-
ment, philanthropy, education, and numerous other topics. We make use of the PSID for
2005.
For our purposes we make use of data from the PSID regarding donations to educational
20The results are qualitatively similar for the concave case.
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Figure 6: The preferred tax rate
institutions, from which we can grasp important information. Before moving to the data,
having a look at Figure 6 we can point out the kind of information that we may obtain from
the data.
As explained, Figure 6 presents the shape of the agents' preferred tax rate, under the con-
vexity assumption, and the current equilibrium tax rate t. Suppose that an agent has a pre-
ferred tax rate that is below the equilibrium one (therefore, agents with income ! 2 [!2; !3]).
This means that, given his utility function, he would prefer to have everyone contributing
to the educational system less than what they currently do, therefore we expect (rational)
agents with income ! 2 [!2; !3] not to donate anything to any educational institution. If we
consider now agents with a preferred tax rate above the equilibrium one (agents with income
! 2 [!1; !2] or ! 2 [!3; !4]), those agents would prefer to have everyone contributing more,
so as to improve the quality of the educational system. Those agents may want to contribute
more, through donations for instance, or they may contribute more only if everyone would do
so (through an increase in the tax rate) but they prefer not to pay more for education if only
part of the population does so. From the previous considerations, we can infer the following:
i) if we observe a donation, by the weak axiom of revealed preferences, we expect the agent to
be in favour of an increase in the tax rate (if he voluntarily reduces his disposable income in
order to improve the quality of education, he should be also in favour of a generalised increase
in the tax rate, implying that everyone would contribute more); ii) if we do not observe a
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donation, we cannot infer that the agent would prefer a lower tax rate, as he may be willing
to contribute more only if everyone does so.
If the preferred tax rate is convex, we should therefore expect to observe more donations
amongst agents in the tails (! 2 [!1; !2] or ! 2 [!3; !4]) and very few for middle-income
agents. Note that in our theoretical model we support the idea that agents with income
below the average have an additional incentive to support high tax rates (compared to agents
with income above the average) which is related to the redistributive eect of education. This
component should not aect donations, therefore the predictions that we can make when we
observe the data about donation may underestimate the willingness for a larger tax rate for
the agents with income below the average.
Once we have derived the implications of a convex shape of the preferred tax rate and
its relation with donations to education we can observe in the data if we nd such pat-
tern. From the PSDI we use questions ER27449 \Donations (>25$) to charity last year", 21
ER27474 \Donations to organization for education",22 ER27475 \Dollar amount of education
donations" and ER28037 \Total family income in 2004". Using the income variable we sort
individuals by income (in deciles); Table 2 presents the main gures of the variables used.
Table 2: Donations descriptive statistics
all indiv. # total donat. %/ all indiv. # donat. to educ %/ all indiv. %/ total donat.
D1 income 799 203 25,4% 19 2,4% 9,4%
D2 income 798 300 37,6% 31 3,9% 10,3%
D3 income 814 377 46,3% 61 7,5% 16,2%
D4 income 780 384 49,2% 54 6,9% 14,1%
D5 income 796 466 58,5% 78 9,8% 16,7%
D6 income 808 515 63,7% 93 11,5% 18,1%
D7 income 782 554 70,8% 112 14,3% 20,2%
D8 income 797 647 81,2% 140 17,6% 21,6%
D9 income 804 684 85,1% 182 22,6% 26,6%
D10 income 788 713 90,5% 306 38,8% 42,9%
Totals 7966 4843 60,8% 1076 13,5% 22,2%
Note: rows show data for individuals sorted by income deciles.
As expected the number of donations increases with income, this is especially true for
donations to education (except for the 4th decile of income that decreases). However, for
our purposes we compute the ratio between the amount of donations to education and the
21The survey includes the following denition: \Charitable organizations include religious or non-prot
organizations that help those in need or that serve and support the public interest. They range in size
from national organizations like the United Way and the American Red Cross down to local community
organizations. They serve a variety of purposes such as religious activity, helping people in need, health care
and medical research, education, arts, environment, and international aid. Our denition of charity does not
include political contributions".
22\For example, colleges, grade schools, PTAs, libraries, or scholarship funds. Please do not include direct
tuition payments for you or other family members".
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Figure 7: Total amount of donations to education over total income (by income deciles)
total income to capture the relative eort of each household when donating to education, see
Figure 7.
Note that the shape presented in Figure 7 resembles a convex curve indicating that low
and high income levels devote a higher share of its income to donations to education (they
relatively donate more to education). Following the previous argument (see Figure 6) we can
infer that those individuals have a higher tax rate and, hence, are more prone to want more
spending in education in society. As a result of this evidence, we solve our theoretical model
in the case of a convex preferred tax rate.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Given that the rst derivatives are positive ( @U@X  0, @U@b  0, @G@b  0) and the second derivat-
ives are negative ( @
2U
@X2
 0, @2U
@b2
 0, @2G
@b2
 0), third derivatives have to be positive. To prove
that, consider that a negative second derivative implies that the rst derivative is a decreasing
function. Then, a decreasing and concave function with an unbounded domain necessarily
crosses, at some point, the horizontal ax, taking then negative values. This contradicts the
fact that, for any value of the variable, the rst derivative is always positive. Then a necessary
condition for the rst derivative to be always positive, when the second derivative is negative,
is that the third derivative is positive (thus the rst derivative is a decreasing and convex
function).
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Denote t1 the tax that maximises the utility of an agent of income !1 when his child at-
tends a private school; by Equation 11 it has to be that ! @U@b = k
@!(tz)
@tz
@G
@b +
@V
@t

!=!1;t=t1
(i.e., the marginal cost and benet of the tax are equal). Suppose that an agent with the
same income prefers his child to attend a public school. Compared to the previous agent,
the larger consumption of numeraire implies that the left hand side (LHS) of the equa-
tion (the marginal cost) decreases. Instead, the marginal benet (right hand side - RHS)
is larger, because it includes, for people whose children attend a public school, the ex-
tra term corresponding to the marginal benet in the rst period of life of an increase in
the tax rate. As a consequence, t1 cannot be the equilibrium tax for this other agent and
! @U@b < k
@!(tz)
@tz
@G
@b +
@V
@t +
!
np
@U
@X

!=!1;t=t1
. Since LHS is increasing in t and RHS is decreasing,
the equilibrium tax must be higher (see Figure 8).
Figure 8: Preferred tax under public and private regime
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